諾獎得主斯賓塞：中國正進入複雜過渡期 25年內將成發達國家

導讀：2001年諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者、美國增長與發展委員會主席邁克爾-斯賓塞今日為新浪財經獨家撰文表示，中國正在進入一個複雜的過渡時期，這將有希望在未來25年奠定其成為發達國家的地位。中國必須面對國內轉型的挑戰，以維持經濟的增長，但中國也必須承擔更大的國際責任。

以下是邁克爾-斯賓塞撰文原文。

中國正在進入一個複雜的過渡時期，這將有希望在未來25年奠定了其成為發達國家的地位。經過三十年的經濟的持續增長，並且取得一個非常成功\的應對全球危機的政策，中國的自信心在不斷攀升。但是，政府從這場危機得到的經驗教訓，可能不會是長期發展的最佳指南。

中國面臨的幾個平行和相關的挑戰是至關重要的內部發展以及全球的經濟關系。其中包括：

一個重大的經濟微觀結構調整以鞏固新興的中等收入國家的地位；

一個宏觀的轉變：一個更高的家庭收入和消費的水准以及迅速擴展的中產階層；

中國現在上升的人均收入不平等的轉變； 由于投資而降低了非常高的儲蓄水平，從而減少日常賬戶盈余；

減少能源和碳在未來增長的能量；

承擔更大的國際責任。

事實上，中國已經到達了對全球經濟具有系統重要性的一個點。但是中國達到這個點，與以往任何一個具有系統重要性的前任國家相比，其人均收入水平相對來講是低得多。原因是中國是迄今為止人口最多的國家，卻有著非常迅速的持續30年的經濟增長。因此，計算這個國家的全球影響力已經被添加到一個複雜的政策議程，而大多數國家擁有以維持國內市場為重點的奢華。

中國需要平衡這些國內和國際優先事項，但是卻具有很少的歷史經驗來指導應該怎樣做。(印度將要在大約10年後來面對這一問題，目前它還在持續的快速增長的過程中。)

國民平均收入達到約4000美元(或因購買力的調整，人均收入可以達到更高值)，中國經濟的重要組成部分已經是或正在進入一個中等收入的地位。這是一個困難的轉折，在這個過程中，許\多國家因結構改革失去作用而喪失了動力。

例如，中國的勞動密集型出口行業正在失去其競爭優勢，必須允許\他們減少或者遷移到內陸(最終將會減少)，他們將被更多依賴于技術和人力資本的行業所取代。

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在這一過渡期間，服務業毫無疑問地將繼續增長；高增值的行業和職能的上游和下游的加工工業也需要蓬勃發展；全球性品牌應該開始出現，政府對企業的所有權將繼續減少，公共部門的投資將轉向教育和研發。

全球和國內的市場，而不是中國政府，將越來越多地推動這種轉變。目標制定部門將減少，國內市場和不斷壯大的中產階級將表現更加突出，公共部門的投資支持將加快城市化的發展進程。

在中國，家庭可支配收入約占中國國民收入的60%，家庭儲蓄率接近可支配收入的30%。相比其他國家，這些數字或低或高。而對于中國來講，這使得消費量是在國內生產總值的40-45%範圍內。要加強國內市場來推動收入的增長，並且加速中產階級的增長，這些數字需要轉變。

中國的家庭收入必須有所提高，並且，要提供更充分的社會保障、保險和服務，而預防性儲蓄應當減少。通過擴大作為增長動力的國內市場，這兩方面都將支持中等收入的過渡，並且在面對前瞻性的全球需求疲軟的時候仍然能夠維持經濟的增長。

但最重要的是，快速增長的國內市場，尤其是服務行業，需要在很大程度上取代將農村人口拉入現代經濟的就業出口部門。由于出口部門進入高增值的行業，它將不再象過去那樣提供如此有效的功\能。

中國的企業部門在留存收益之外提供資金用來投資，而不必提高家庭部門的資本。政府繼續持有超過50%的剩余的國有企業，但並不需要或使用企業收入。有關這兩個收入來源(公司和政府)的很大一部分必須重新定向到家庭部門。

高效增長和都市化導致城市地區的收入迅速上升，在農村地區增幅則較小。一大批移民勞工和家庭(150至200百萬人)正式居住地仍在農村，但事實上是城鎮居民擁有一定的權利和獲得服務的機會。由此而造成的社會緊張局勢正在通過擴大農村服務、提供投資城市基礎設施和服務，以及農村移民的身份合法化等方式來解決。

中國在過去遇到了艱巨的挑戰，並已普遍勝過了外界懷疑的預測。但是，現在中國也必須面對全球性壓力和責任，這部分地反映中國龐大的規模和影響。但是，中國也要面臨這樣一個外部環境：與國家的政體偶爾地是敵對的，有時忽視或低估的數百萬從貧困中迅速崛起的中國人，視全球經濟為無價值游戲的傾向，錯誤地把中國的經濟成就歸因于某些領域的不合作政策，例如匯率管理。

中國必須面對國內轉型的挑戰，以維持經濟的增長，並要聲稱有權發展而不因其規模而受到懲罰。但中國也必須承擔更大的關于全球性失衡、經濟和財政穩定的責任和治理，以及代表較弱的發展中國家的利益。世界的其他國家會在這一複雜的平衡結果中得到巨大的利益。

新浪財經美國洛杉磯記者 段皎宇 編譯

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以下是邁克爾-斯賓塞文章的英文原文。

China’s Next Mountain to Climb

China is entering a complex set of transitions that will lay the foundations for the advanced-country status that it hopes to reach in the next 25 years. After three decades of sustained growth and a remarkably successful policy response to the recent global crisis, Chinese self-confidence is soaring. But the lessons that the government may draw from the crisis may not be the best guides for the long term

China faces several parallel and related challenges that are crucial for its internal development as well as its global economic relations. Among these are:

● a major microeconomic restructuring of the economy to anchor the country’s emerging middle income country status;

● a macroeconomic shift to a higher level of household income and consumption and a more rapid expansion of the middle class;

● a reversal of the country’s now rising income inequality; lowering the very high savings level relative to investment and thus reducing the current-account surplus;

● reducing the energy and carbon intensity of future growth;

● assuming greater global responsibilities。

Indeed, China has arrived at a point where its impact on the global economy is systemically important. But it has reached this point at a much lower level of per capita income than any systemically important predecessor. The reason is that China is, by far, the most populous country to have sustained very rapid growth for 30 years. So reckoning with the country’s global impact has been added to an already complex policy agenda, at a point when most countries have the luxury of maintaining a largely domestic focus。

China needs to balance these domestic and international priorities, but it has very little historical experience to guide it. (India will take on this problem in about a decade, as it continues on its rapid-growth path。)

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With a per capita income of around ＄4000 (more with purchasing power adjustments)， important parts of China’s economy are already, or are now entering, middle-income status. This is a difficult transition, during which many countries have lost momentum as structural transformations stall。

For example, China’s labor-intensive export sectors are losing their competitive edge. They must be allowed to decline or move inland (and eventually decline). They will be replaced by sectors that rely more on technology and human capital。

In this transition, services will undoubtedly grow. Higher value-added sectors and functions that are upstream and downstream from processing industries will also need to flourish. Global brands should start to appear, and government ownership of enterprises will continue to diminish. Public-sector investment will shift toward education and R&D。

Global and domestic markets, rather than China’s government, will increasingly drive this transition. Targeting of sectors will decline. The domestic market and a growing middle class will assume greater prominence. Urbanization will accelerate with supporting public-sector investment。

Household disposable income is about 60% of national income in China, and the household savings rate is close to 30% of disposable income. These numbers are low and high, respectively, compared to other countries. For China, this puts consumption in the range of 40-45% of GDP. To empower the domestic market to drive income growth, and to accelerate the growth of the middle class, these numbers need to shift。

Household income must rise, and, with more ample provision of social security, insurance, and services, precautionary savings should fall. Both will support the middle-income transition by expanding the domestic market as a driver of growth, and will help sustain growth in the face of prospectively weaker global demand。

But, most important, rapid growth of the domestic market, especially the service sector, needs to largely replace the export sector as the employment engine pulling the rural population into the modern economy. As the export sector moves into higher value-added sectors, it will no longer serve this function as effectively as it did in the past。

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China ’s corporate sector has financed much of its investment out of retained earnings without having to raise capital from the household sector. The government continues to own more than 50% of remaining state-owned enterprises, but does not need or use the income. A big portion of these two income streams (corporate and government) needs to be redirected to the household sector。

High growth and urbanization have caused rapid rises in incomes in urban areas, with smaller increases in the rural areas. A large group of migrant workers and families (on the order of 150 to 200 million people) are formally still rural, but in fact are marginal urban residents with constrained rights and access to services. The resulting rise in social tensions is being addressed through expanded provision of rural services, investment in urban infrastructure and service provision, and regularization of migrants’ status。

China has faced daunting challenges in the past – and has generally outperformed the forecasts of skeptics. But now China must face global pressures and responsibilities as well. These partly reflect China’s sheer size and impact. But China also faces an external environment that is occasionally hostile to the country’s form of government; that sometimes overlooks or undervalues the rapid rise of millions of Chinese from poverty; that tends to view the global economy as a zero-sum game; and that mistakenly attributes China’s economic success to non-cooperative policies in areas like exchange-rate management。

China must confront the challenge of domestic restructuring to sustain growth, while asserting the right to develop without being penalized because of its size. But it must also assume greater responsibility for global imbalances, economic and financial stability, and governance, as well as represent the interests of less powerful developing countries. The rest of the world has a huge stake in the outcome of this complex balancing act。